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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PERMITTING OF 
SYNTHETIC FUELS PROJECTS* 
Robert M. Hallman** 
The developing synthetic fuels industry presents a unique chal-
lenge to the regulatory process of government. As a former govern-
ment official, I have observed agencies and courts at local, state, and 
federal levels struggling with the ihtricacies of synthetic fuels proj-
ects. Among the most difficult issues presented by the synthetic 
fuels industry is its potential environmental impact. 
Environmental considerations are critical to the successful devel-
opment of a synthetic fuels industry relying, as it does, on coal, oil 
shale, and tar sands as raw materials. Synthetic fuels projects pre-
sent significant environmental problems: air and water pollution; 
solid waste disposal; land-use decisions; and extensive water con-
sumption; and will result in occupational health and safety, as well as 
socio-economic, impacts. Further, the products and byproducts of 
synthetic fuels projects may pose health and environmental prob-
lems themselves. 
Attempts to control the environmental impact of the synthetic 
fuels industry are hindered by its somewhat unique situation. The in-
dustry is developing at the same time that regulatory schemes for it 
are being devised. There is very little experience with commercial-
size plants-indeed, there is no commercial-scale facility operating 
in this country. In addition, there is little information available on 
the nature of effluents and byproducts, or on specific consequences 
• This introductory piece is taken from a speech given by Mr. Hallman before the Federal 
Bar Association Seminar on Synthetic Fuels on May 20, 1981, in Washington, D.C . 
•• Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel, Washington, D.C. office. Formerly served as Deputy 
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of synfuels! activities. Given our limited knowledge and experience, 
uncertainty abounds-uncertainty as to substantive regulations and 
their promulgation; and uncertainty concerning costs of compliance. 
These technological, regulatory, and economic uncertainties are 
further exacerbated by the maze that faces synthetic fuels projects 
in the form of an extensive web of permitting authorities and 
numerous opportunities for court challenges to projects. More than 
twenty federal regulatory programs can be involved in review of a 
synthetic fuels project. These projects face a vast number of ap-
provals at the state and local levels as well. 
With few exceptions, each regulatory requirement has been 
adopted in isolation, with little or no attention paid to its relationship 
to an overall approval process for energy projects generally, or for 
synthetic fuels projects in particular. Each set of requirements has 
tended to give rise to a new or distinct set of administrative and 
court procedures, with no mechanism for coordination or for ensur-
ing that decisions will occur in time to meet the needs for which a 
particular project is designed. 
Estimates of the time required to clear these labyrinths and con-
struct a commercial-scale facility vary from a quite optimistic two to 
three years, to (in my view a more realistic) four to six years. Con-
troversial projects-a category in which many synthetic fuels proj-
ects will undoubtedly fall-may take as long as a decade. The envi-
ronmental and regulatory challenges to the development of a com-
mercially viable synthetic fuels industry are thus readily apparent 
and far-reaching. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction into the per-
mitting issues now emerging as a source of substantial uncertainty 
to synfuel project sponsors. The topics discussed include: (1) changes 
in the approach of the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to developing pollution control guidance for synthetic fuels 
projects; (2) possible means of expediting the permit process for syn-
thetic fuels projects; and (3) the potential impact of permitting con-
siderations on the operations of the United States Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation. 
I. CHANGES IN EPA POLLUTION CONTROL GUIDANCE FOR THE 
SYNTHETIC FUELS INDUSTRY 
Because of the lack of experience with synfuels plants and the con-
sequent lack of data about pollutants and control technologies, the 
1. The terms "synthetic fuels" and "synfuels" will be used interchangeably throughout this 
article. 
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EP A has not employed the conventional approach of issuing 
industry-wide regulatory requirements that set performance stand-
ards which serve as a floor of pollution control for synfuels technol-
ogies. Instead, the permitting process will be the primary regulatory 
mechanism by which environmental controls are established for the 
initial generation of synfuels projects. In other words, the terms and 
conditions of individual permits will determine how each particular 
plant is controlled. 
Under these circumstances, the EPA during the Carter Adminis-
tration embarked upon a somewhat unique approach to guide in-
dustrial designers, and federal and state permitting agencies respon-
sible for synfuels projects. It decided to develop a set of pollution 
control guidance documents (PCGD's) for each major synfuels tech-
nology.2 These included low-, medium-, and high-Btu gasification; oil 
shale; indirect coalliquifaction; and direct coalliquifaction. Accord-
ing to the EPA, these documents were intended to be nonbinding, 
nonregulatory materials designed to guide permitting authorities in 
establishing the terms and conditions of individual permits under 
their particular regulatory requirements. As explained by the EPA, 
the PCGD's were intended to provide the EPA's evaluation of "the 
best and most cost effective way to control these plants. . . . They 
will be technology-based but not technology-specifying, indicating 
ranges of suggested performance and pointing out the site-specific 
and technical factors that should be kept in mind during permit 
negotiations." 3 
The documents were also unique in that they examined en-
vironmental impacts on a multi- (or cross-) media basis. The EPA 
looked concurrently at all pollutants discharged to the air, water, 
and land, including those not currently regulated, in designing an en-
vironmental protection strategy. While the EPA planned to seek 
public comment on the documents prior to their final release, they 
were not to be developed pursuant to formal rulemaking procedures 
under the Administrative Procedure Act4 normally employed for 
promulgation of pollution control standards. 
The above-described pollution control guidance strategy, however, 
appears to have been abandoned by the new EPA Administrator 
Anne Gorsuch in favor of conducting some limited research, subject 
to available funds, on specific environmental issues associated with 
individual synfuel technologies. Thus, in contrast to the PCGD ap-
2. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA & SYNTHETIC FUELS: IN BRIEF 3 (1981). 
3. [d. 
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 and §§ 701-706 (1976). 
764 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:761 
proach, the EPA does not now intend to provide information as to 
the range of available control options for particular technologies, or 
policy-related recommendations or considerations for permit 
writers; rather EPA personnel will apparently be limited primarily 
to providing technical assistance for specific permits on an as-
available basis.6 The rationale for this switch in approach appears to 
be at least twofold: (1) budget cuts; and (2) a feeling that, while the 
PCGD's would be styled as guidance materials for permitting 
authorities, permit writers would place undue reliance on them so 
that they would in effect be treated as de facto federal standards. 
While the current EPA approach offers little direction to project 
sponsors as to what types and levels of controls to expect from per-
mitting authorities, it does appear to maximize the flexibility of spon-
sors and regulators in fashioning requirements for particular proj-
ects on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, the substantial 
reduction in support for the permitting process reflected in the 
EPA's current cutbacks could seriously hamper efforts to expedite 
administrative consideration of permit applications. The absence of 
data on pollution control technologies, information which the PCGD 
system was designed to develop, and of technical experts trained, at 
a minimum, to identify the relevant questions about each synthetic 
fuels technology, will undoubtedly add to the burden of permitting 
officials and industry in negotiating agreeable permit conditions for 
each specific project. For example, state or local governments are 
not likely (at least in the near term) to have the capacity to develop 
the kind of information and expertise which might have been 
available under the PCGD approach. 
Moreover, reduced efforts by the EPA to address environmental 
issues in this area could lead to increased concern on the part of the 
public as to the potential impacts of synfuels projects, and generate 
increased opposition to efforts to adopt expedited permitting pro-
cedures on the ground that more-not less-time plus extensive pro-
cedural safeguards are required to insure adequate assessment of all 
risks and options for each project. In short, withdrawal of federal ef-
forts to develop base-line information and guidance with respect to 
environmental controls for various synthetic fuels technologies may 
have an adverse impact on regulatory reform efforts at all govern-
ment levels. 
5. See, e.g., Inside E.P.A., Oct. 13, 1981, at 1-2. 
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II. OPTIONS FOR EXPEDITING THE PERMITTING PROCESS 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
As indicated earlier, synfuels projects confront a time-consuming 
and cumbersome regulatory maze. Prompt efforts to ensure timely, 
coordinated decisions by administrative agencies; reduce judicial 
delay; and provide a reasonable degree of regulatory certainty for 
project sponsors, appear essential if national energy goals are to be 
met. The available options to improve the process of regulating syn-
fuels projects are: (1) administrative steps to streamline decision-
making at the federal level; (2) legislation to mandate expediting pro-
cedures by federal authorities and to encourage cooperative efforts 
by states; (3) actions by states to expedite decisionmaking and in-
itiate coordination with federal authorities; and (4) comprehensive 
reform mandating expediting procedures by both state and federal 
officials. 
A. Administrative Action at the Federal Level 
Administrative action at the federal level would involve tightening 
up decisionmaking as much as possible under existing authorities. 
Examples of efforts along this line are the Consolidated Permit 
Regulations issued by the EPA 6 and the Priority Energy Project 
Tracking System":""'an internal procedure of the EPA which that 
agency has used to negotiate deadlines with project sponsors and to 
manage review of their permits. Reform through this means 
depends, of course, upon the flexibility of existing authorities. More-
over, this approach has limited utility with regard to independent 
federal agencies and cannot reach the area of judicial delay. 
B. Mandated Federal Expediting 
Legislation could be structured to direct new or existing federal 
executive bodies to select projects for priority treatment and to 
establish decision deadlines binding on federal agencies. These 
deadlines could be shorter than required by otherwise applicable law. 
Enforcement of deadlines could be accomplished by: (1) providing for 
automatic approval of a project unless an agency acts within the 
period specified; (2) transferring decisionmaking responsibility from 
6. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (1980). 
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a delinquent agency to an expediting body or the President; and/or 
(3) providing for court enforcement. 
This approach could also include authority to exempt (possibly with 
some form of Congressional oversight) projects from new federal re-
quirements and to consolidate review of federal agency decisions in a 
single federal court. For nonfederal entities, the federal oversight 
body might be directed to request proposed decision timetables from 
state and local agencies; to seek their agreement to deadlines; and, 
where agreement is not possible, to issue voluntary timetables for 
decision.7 Technical and/or financial assistance might also be offered 
to induce desired action at the state level. 
c. State Action 
Initiatives can be and have been undertaken by states both to ex-
pedite and consolidate permitting procedures at the state level and 
to coordinate local, state, and federal activities. To expedite pro-
cedures at the state level, a few states have enacted energy facility 
siting legislation which provides for a state agency to coordinate 
state permitting and establishes deadlines for permitting decisions 
on the part of responsible agencies.8 Other states have enacted 
legislation aimed primarily at establishing clear and expeditious time 
frames within which permitting decisions on major development 
projects must be made.9 
A third approach to the problem is illustrated by Colorado's per-
mitting process. To coordinate local, state, and federal activities, 
Colorado has administratively established a so-called "joint-review 
process" for major energy and mineral resource development proj-
ects, including synthetic fuels projects. Based on a project sponsor's 
request, a preliminary decision is made by the Colorado Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR) as to whether a proposed project will be 
accepted for participation in the program. The basic criteria for proj-
ect selection are: (1) whether the project is "major"; (2) whether its 
application is submitted early in the permitting process; and (3) 
7. Legislation along these lines, which would establish an Energy Mobilization Council in 
the Executive Office of the President, has been introduced in Congress. H.R. 3236, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
8. See, e.g., Montana Major Facility Siting Act, MONT. CODE ANN., ch. 20, SS 75-20-101 to 
75-20-1205 (1981). 
9. See, e.g., California Development Project Act of 1977, as amended, CAL. GoV'T CODE, 
n 65920-65960 (West Supp. 1980); CAL. PuB. REs. CODE, SS 21080; 21151.5; 21167.2; and 
21167.3 (West Supp. 1980). 
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whether the resources are available to conduct a thorough review of 
the project. If accepted, the state DNR attempts through persuasion 
to secure the active participation of federal, state, and local officials, 
and the project sponsor in a joint-review process. The purpose of the 
joint-review team is to define the roles and responsibilities of all rele-
vant agencies and the project sponsors; to prepare a project-specific 
decision schedule; and to conduct several public participation ac-
tivities. The process is not an attempt to develop an energy facility 
siting procedure, or to change any established regulatory respon-
sibilities or procedures. Rather, it is initiated only through the re-
quest of a project proponent and is entirely voluntary. There are no 
sanctions for failure to meet any established deadlines. 
At least one mining and two synfuel projects (one oil shale project 
and one coal-to-methanol project) have sought to participate in the 
process.10 One state has adopted a process similar to that of Col-
orado and several others are reportedly considering establishing a 
procedure like the joint-review process based on the generally favor-
able response to Colorado's efforts.ll 
D. Mandated Action at Federal and State Levels 
An agency similar to the proposed federal Energy Mobilization 
Board (EMB)12 with authority to promulgate and enforce expediting 
procedures (including decision deadlines) binding on federal and 
state authorities might be the most comprehensive and direct ap-
proach. It is also likely to be the most controversial. This legislation 
would attempt to address the problem of judicial delay by con-
solidating judicial review of federal and state actions affecting priori-
ty energy projects in one federal court. Further, the legislation 
would provide for procedural reform that would bind not only 
federal, but state and local agencies, and would authorize additional 
expediting procedures, e.g., consolidated hearings, for agencies deal-
ing with priority projects. The reform efforts here relate mainly to 
the nature and extent of the federal role in permitting vis-a-vis state 
10. See The Energy Daily, Mar. 17, 1981, at 2; Synfuels, Nov. 6, 1981, at 7-8. 
11. See, e.g., Tennessee Major Energy Project Act of 1981, TENN. CODE ANN., ch. 18, 
§§ 13-18-101 to 13-18-128 (Supp. 1981). 
12. Legislation creating an Energy Mobilization Board was developed by a Conference 
Committee of the Congress in 1980 but was defeated by a vote in the House of Representa-
tives. See CONF. REp. ON S. 1308, 126 CONGo REc. H5479-5495 (daily ed. June 21,1980); 126 
CONGo REc. H5783-5797 (daily ed. June 27, 1980). A similar proposal has been reintroduced 
and is now under consideration. See H.R. 3801, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see also S. 668, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
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and local authorities, but they also touch on the possibility of a 
waiver or suspension of specific laws for priority projects pursuant, 
for example, to expedited legislative procedures. 
III. THE SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION AND 
EXPEDITED PERMITTING 
No assessment of prospects for permitting reform for synthetic 
fuels projects would be complete without consideration of the poten-
tial involvement of the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation 
(SFC). Congress established the SFC in 1980 under the Energy 
Security Act (ESA)13 as an independent federal entity, of limited 
duration, to assist commercial development of synthetic fuels pro-
duction from domestic sources of coal, oil shale, tar sands, and cer-
tain heavy oil resources, through provision of various forms of finan-
cial assistance to the private sector.14 The SFC will have about $14 
billion available for financial assistance during the next three to four 
years.1S 
The basic theory behind the SFC is that it should function as much 
as possible like a private investment bank, although, as a creature of 
federal law, it is subject to a variety of statutory requirements and 
oversight controls. Under the ESA, the SFC's selection of projects 
to receive financial assistance will be done on a competitive basis (to 
the extent feasible) through a series of solicitations issued by the 
SFC, and will be based on a review of a wide range of specific fac-
tors, e.g., diversity and production potential of the technology,16 as 
well as programmatic goals, e.g., 2 million barrels per day of oil 
equivalent nationwide by 1992.17 Given its substantial resources and 
mandate, the SFC's activities could have considerable influence on 
the nature and extent of synthetic fuels projects launched in the near 
future. Its potentially significant role in the emergence of the in-
dustry gives rise to questions as to what obligations the SFC has 
under the ESA, and what opportunities are available to the SFC to 
13. Energy Security Act (ESA), Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. S§ 8701-8795 (Supp. IV 1980». 
14. Water as a source of hydrogen through electrolysis is the other domestic resource 
specified in the ESA. [d. § 112(17) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. S 8702(17». 
The SFC's authority to award financial assistance ends Sept. 30, 1992; the SFC itself ter-
minates Sept. 30, 1997, unless the President terminates it earlier (but in no event prior to 
Sept. 30, 1992). [d. § 191 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8791). 
15. [d. § 152(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8752(a». 
16. [d. § 131(b)(3)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. S 8731(b)(3)(A». 
17. [d. § 125 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8721). 
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address potential environmental impacts associated with, and regu-
latory delays facing, synthetic fuels projects. 
As regards environmental matters, determinations by the SFC to 
award financial assistance to particular projects, as well as the selec-
tion process itself, are expressly exempt from the environmental im-
pact requirements18 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA).19 Moreover, the ESA does not specifically require the 
SFC to consider environmental, health, or safety impacts in select-
ing specific projects for financial assistance. The SFC is not, how-
ever, immune from such considerations. Information on these issues 
is available from several sources including: 
(a) the Administrator of the EPA who is a member of the 
statutory advisory committee to the SFC Board of Directors. 
The committee must review the SFC proposal solicitations, and 
advise the SFC (upon request) on matters within its expertise. 
(b) the SFC itself which is required to consider the ability of 
technologies seeking financial assistance to comply with 
regulatory requirements. 
(c) other federal agencies. Prior to awarding any financial 
assistance, the SFC is authorized to seek the advice and recom-
mendation of, or information maintained by, any federal agency 
or department. 20 
Moreover, the SFC's project selection procedure sets forth a com-
mitment to consider environmental, health and safety, and socio-
economic impacts of projects applying for financial assistance. The 
corporation's Project Evaluation Criteria provide that the SFC will 
consider the status of a project's compliance with all applicable 
regulatory requirements as "an important measure of whether a 
project is sufficiently strong to be considered for financial assist-
ance."21 To assess that status, the SFC will evaluate projects against 
criteria relating to: (1) environmental, health and safety, and regula-
tory acceptability; (2) socio-economic impact; and (3) water availabil-
ity and quality. In addition, each SFC contract for financial assist-
18. Receipt of financial assistance from the SFC, however, does not exempt a project from 
having to comply with applicable local, state, or federal environmental, health, or safety laws 
or regulations. Moreover, if a federal agency is involved with an SFC-assisted project through, 
for example, the issuance of a permit or lease, that agency's action would be subject to NEPA 
and may require a regional as well as a site-specific environmental impact statement. The 
federal agency considering the action will also have to meet other federal "consultative" en-
vironmental requirements applicable to federal agencies. 
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). 
20. ESA, § 172(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8773(a) (Supp. IV 1980». 
21. SECOND SOLICITATION FOR SYNTHETIC FUELS PROJECTS 19 (1981), adopted by the SFC's 
Board of Directors on Dec. 11, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 62,353 (1981). 
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ance must require the recipient to prepare, in consultation with the 
Department of Energy, the EPA, and appropriate state agencies, a 
plan acceptable to the SFC's Board of Directors for the monitoring 
of environmental and health-related emissions from the construction 
and operation of the project.22 
The SFC is also required to file an annual report with the Congress 
and the President which includes recommendations on actions Con-
gress could take to facilitate the SFC's work in achieving the ESA's 
national synthetic fuels production goals. The report must "address 
the environmental impacts of the corporation's generic programs 
and decisions."23 Finally, the SFC must submit to the Congress a 
comprehensive strategy for achieving national synthetic fuels pro-
duction goals on or before June 30, 1984. The strategy is to include 
findings on "the environmental effects associated with each SFC-
assisted project."24 
The SFC has no express authority or jurisdiction to approve the 
projects to which it extends financial assistance. Nevertheless, in 
creating the SFC, Congress was cognizant of the regulatory prob-
lems facing synthetic fuels projects. Specifically, Congress directed 
the corporation to give priority consideration to applications for 
financial assistance "from any concern proposing a synthetic fuels 
project in any State which, in the judgment of the board of directors, 
indicates an intention to expedite all regulatory, licensing, and re-
lated government agency activities which relate to the project."25 It 
is worth noting that this language does not necessarily requite that a 
state have a generalized expediting process; rather, it focuses on 
how the state intends to treat specific corporation-assisted projects. 
The SFC has recently announced that it will "use a functional ap-
proach" in determining whether particular states exhibit an intent to 
expedite permitting. In general, this will involve an examination by 
the SFC of (1) whether a proposal specifies a realistic, detailed per-
22. ESA, S 131(e) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8731(e) (Supp. IV 1980». A major unresolved 
issue in this regard concerns the criteria which the SFC will employ to assess the acceptability 
of environmental monitoring plans developed by project sponsors and, specifically, whether 
the SFC will require actions beyond those set forth in applicable environmental control per-
mits. The SFC has recently rejected a recommendation by the General Accounting Office to 
publish guidelines implementing the environmental monitoring provisions of the ESA, reason-
ing that such guidelines would, in some respects, be redundant and, in other respects, 
premature. Letter from Edward E. Noble, Chairman, SFC to Milton J. Socolar, Acting Comp-
troller General of the United States, Nov. 25, 1981. 
23. ESA, S 177(d) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. S 8777(d) (Supp. IV 1980». 
24. Id. S 126(bX3) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. S 8722(bX3». 
25. Id. S 127(f) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8723(f). 
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mit timeline; (2) whether the timeline is consistent with the orderly 
and timely progress of the project; and (3) whether the timeline is 
consistent with experience of projects and relevant agencies.26 While 
these factors appear to be pertinent considerations, additional items 
which more directly relate to the nature and extent of a particular 
state's commitment to expedite permitting would seem to warrant 
examination, particularly if the ESA mandate to provide priority to 
expediting states is to be utilized to promote regulatory reform. 
In evaluating a state's policy on expediting actions, the corpora-
tion should begin by examining the existing state regulatory ap-
paratus, together with state policies for the development of syn-
thetic fuels as reflected, for example, in the plans, pronouncements, 
or programs of responsible state officials. Where an identifiable ex-
pediting program is not in place, it would seem appropriate for the 
SFC to consider good faith commitments to establish effective pro-
grams in a timely manner. Items which, on their face, would appear 
to be important ingredients of any good faith efforts include: binding 
deadlines for major milestones in the project's development; elimina-
tion of duplicative application requirements; consolidation of major 
proceedings; and coordination with appropriate federal and state of-
ficials. A commitment to provide sufficient resources would also be 
relevant. 
At this point, it is not possible to determine how active the SFC 
will be in pursuing regulatory reform for synthetic fuels projects it 
decides to assist. It could simply decide to leave this matter to proj-
ect sponsors. On the other hand, the SFC has available to it certain 
information-gathering and persuasive powers which might be used 
to assist project sponsors. For example, it could work through its 
statutory advisory committee to seek prompt action at the federal 
level; establish lines of communication and consultation with state 
officials to promote voluntary efforts at that level; and/or utilize the 
leverage provided by the priority assigned to states committed to ex-
peditious project permitting to promote specific reforms. 
Considerable opportunities are available to the SFC to influence 
the nature of environmental controls imposed upon the synthetic 
fuels projects it assists, and to encourage adoption of reforms to ex-
pedite permitting at all levels of government. However, the current 
administration appears largely committed to deemphasizing the 
government's role in the energy area in favor of a so-called "free 
26. SECOND SOLICITATION FOR SYNTHETIC FUELS PROJECTS, supra note 16, at 19-20. 
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market" approach, and to the transfer of increased responsibility for 
environmental regulation to the states. Thus, it would not be surpris-
ing to see the SFC adopt a hands-off policy in these areas, i.e., effec-
tively to defer to regulatory authorities at each level of government 
for initiatives concerning regulatory reform and for establishment of 
environmental requirements. The most likely spur to any activism on 
the SFC's part would be requests from project sponsors who might 
find SFC initiatives useful in launching, or in resolving particular 
issues relating to, specific projects. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The development of synthetic fuels is a new endeavor fraught with 
many familiar problems-problems of pollution, waste disposal, and 
resource conservation. Government officials and projects sponsors 
are searching for mechanisms to address these problems at the same 
time that the synfuels industry is developing. The regulatory 
challenge presented by this situation has prompted local, state, and 
federal agencies and legislatures to explore innovative approaches 
for permitting synfuels projects. 
Adoption of a comprehensive solution based on the Energy 
Mobilization Board model appears unlikely at this time, owing to its 
controversial nature and the "new federalism" propounded by the 
Reagan Administration which posits minimum federal involvement 
and maximum state discretion in the environmental area. On the 
other hand, absent extreme budget cutbacks, prospects appear 
reasonably good for some administrative efforts to expedite federal 
permitting, and continued efforts by states to rationalize their 
regulatory programs, as well as to increase coordination with federal 
authorities. Whether such efforts will materially improve the current 
regulatory maze is not possible to judge in the abstract. Much will de-
pend upon the extent of and incentives for coordination among af-
fected parties and their commitment, at a minimum, to create 
workable means for ensuring clear, meaningful decision deadlines; 
consolidated, timely judicial review of agency decisions; and, 
reasonable certainty as to the terms to govern construction and 
operation of approved projects. Failure to continue vigorous pursuit 
of regulatory reform in the synfuels area will only serve to under-
mine efforts-whether governmentally or free-market oriented-to 
effectuate the nation's energy goals as quickly and soundly as possi-
ble. 
